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Digest:  Munson v. Del Taco, Inc. 
Joseph A. Chern 
Opinion by Werdegar, J., expressing the unanimous view of 
the court. 
Issues 
(1) Does a plaintiff seeking damages, under California Civil 
Code section 52,1 claiming unequal treatment on the basis of 
disability in violation of California Civil Code section 51 (“Unruh 
Civil Rights Act”)2 and Americans with Disabilities Act of 19903 
(“ADA”) need to prove intentional discrimination? 
(2) If plaintiff must prove intentional discrimination, what 
does “intentional discrimination” mean in this context? 
Facts 
Plaintiff Kenneth Munson has a physical disability that 
requires the use of a wheelchair.4  He was a patron at a Del Taco 
restaurant in San Bernardino, California, which was owned and 
operated by defendant Del Taco, Inc.5  Plaintiff brought action in 
state court, alleging that the restaurant discriminated against 
him on the basis of his disability, because he encountered 
architectural barriers6 that denied him access to the parking 
area and restrooms.7  He sought injunctive relief, damages, and 
attorney fees under California Civil Code section 52 (“section 
52”).8  The action was removed to federal court.9 
After cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court 
granted partial summary judgment in favor of plaintiff.10  The 
 1 CAL. CIV. CODE § 52 (West 2007). 
 2 CAL. CIV. CODE § 51 (West 2007) (“Unruh Civil Rights Act”). 
 3 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213 (2006). 
 4 Munson v. Del Taco, Inc., 208 P.3d 623, 625 (Cal. 2009). 
 5 Id. 
 6 Plaintiff’s primary complaint was that the doorway of the restaurant bathroom 
was too narrow for a wheelchair and the restroom itself was not adequately designed for a 
wheelchair user. Id. at n.3.  Following the complaint, defendant remodeled the restaurant 
to correct these and other problems. Id. 
 7 Id. at 625. 
 8 Id. 
 9 Id. at 623. 
 10 Id. at 625. 
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district court concluded there was no genuine issue of fact that 
an architectural barrier existed and that the restroom doorway 
widening was readily achievable.11  Therefore, an ADA violation 
occurred and plaintiff was entitled to pursue statutory 
damages.12 
In lieu of holding a jury trial on the issue of damages, the 
parties stipulated to $12,000 in damages.13  Defendant appealed 
the district court’s decision granting plaintiff’s motion for partial 
summary judgment.14 
The California Supreme Court previously held that proof of 
intentional discrimination was necessary to obtain damages 
under section 52, despite legislative additions to include 
unintentional ADA violations under the Unruh Civil Rights 
Act.15  On appeal, defendant argued that plaintiff failed to 
introduce sufficient evidence to establish the requisite intent 
under the Unruh Civil Rights Act.16  Plaintiff defends that such 
intent is not required or, alternatively, that the requisite intent 
is the intent not to remove barriers to access where readily 
achievable.17  The Court of Appeals certified this issue to the 
Supreme Court of California.18 
Analysis 
1.  Statutory Background 
California Civil Code section 51 provides substantive 
protection against invidious discrimination in public 
accommodations and section 52 specifies the remedies for 
violations of section 51.19  Prior to 1992, the interrelated 
statutory scheme of section 51 and 52 required proof of 
intentional discrimination in public accommodations in violation 
of the terms of that statute.20  Subsequently, in order to conform 
aspects of California law to the recently enacted ADA, the 
Legislature amended section 51 (“the 1992 Amendment”) to 
incorporate violations under the ADA as violations of section 
 11 Id. 
 12 Id. 
 13 Id. 
 14 Id. 
 15 Id. (citing Gunther v. Lin, 144 Cal.App.4th 223 (Cal. 2006)). 
 16 Id. 
 17 Id. at 626. 
 18 Id. at 624. 
 19 Id. at 626 (citing CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 51,52 (West 2007)). 
 20 Id. at 626–27 (discussing the holding of Harris v. Capital Growth Investors XIV, 
52 Cal.3d 1142 (Cal. 1991)). 
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51.21  The incorporated ADA provisions include access 
requirements to facilities, which do not require a showing of 
intentional discrimination if removal of architectural barriers is 
readily achievable.22 
2.  Statutory Language and Context 
In light of the statutory history of sections 51 and 52, the 
court noted that a reasonable interpretation of those sections 
authorize a private action for damages of ADA violations without 
proof of intentional discrimination.23  However, despite the 1992 
Amendment, section 52 does not expressly state that its remedies 
apply to every violation of section 51, but only to any person who 
“denies, aids or incites a denial, or makes any discrimination or 
distinction contrary to Section 51.”24  Therefore, another 
linguistically possible interpretation is that section 52 authorizes 
a private action for damages only for ADA violations involving 
intentional discrimination.25   
But this latter interpretation is without historical support.26  
Section 52 has always provided the enforcement mechanism for 
violations of section 51.27  The Court has only held that 
unintentional violations did not violate section 52 at all, prior to 
the1992 Amendment.28  Therefore, it must follow the effect of the 
amendment is to create an exception for the need to show 
intentional discrimination for remediable violations under 
section 52.29 
3.  Legislative History 
The legislative history of the 1992 Amendment indicates the 
legislative intent was to “provid[e] persons injured by a violation 
of the ADA with the remedies provided by the Unruh Act (e.g., 
right of private action for damages).”30  Although the legislative 
history does not distinguish between intentional and 
unintentional discrimination, any doubt must be resolved by the 
principle that the Unruh Act “must be construed liberally in 
order to. . . create and preserve a nondiscriminatory environment 
 21 Id. at 627 (codifying this amendment in CAL. CIV. CODE § 51(f) (West 2007)). 
 22 Id. at 628. 
 23 Id. at 628–29 (referencing the interpretation embraced by the court in Lentini v. 
California Center for the Arts, 370 F.3d 837 (9th Cir. 2004)). 
 24 Id. at 629. 
 25 Id. (citing Gunther v. Lin, 144 Cal.App.4th 223, 234–35 (Cal. 2006)). 
 26 Id. 
 27 Id. 
 28 Id. (citing Harris v. Capital Growth Investors XIV, 52 Cal.3d 1142, 1175 (Cal. 
1991)). 
 29 Id. at 630. 
 30 Id. (quoting Assem. B., No. 1077, Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1991–92)). 
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in California business establishments.”31  Accordingly, the 
evidence suggests the 1992 Amendment not only prohibits ADA 
violations under the Unruh Act, but also provides remedial 
damages for any such violation under section 52.32 
4.  Relationship to Other Statutes and Prevention of Abusive 
Litigation 
The court rejects the argument that there was a deliberate 
legislative choice to require proof of intentional discrimination 
under the Unruh Civil Rights Act, which provided minimum 
damages of $4,000.33  Although unintentional violations could be 
remedied under the Disabled Persons Act,34 which provided 
minimum damages of only $1,000, the 1992 Amendments were 
not only made to the Unruh Civil Rights Act, but also to the 
Disabled Persons Act.35  Consequently, the minimum damages 
under the two laws were identical at $250 and the possible 
difference in minimum damages for greater scienter was 
eliminated by the 1992 Amendment.36 
Similarly, the Legislature acknowledges that the Unruh 
Civil Rights Act and the Disabled Persons Act have significant 
areas of overlapping application and expressly prohibits double 
recover.37  Nevertheless, there are unique provisions to both 
statutory schemes, which do not render either section redundant 
and eliminates the need to restrict any the remediable 
violations.38 
Finally, the court gives ultimate deference to the Legislature 
to consider whether there may be a need for statutory alterations 
to prevent “abusive private legal actions and settlement 
tactics.”39  Courts are bound to interpret the statutes in 
accordance with legislative intent, free from substituting its own 
policy judgments.40 
Holding 
The court held that a plaintiff seeking damages under 
California Civil Code section 52, who claims the denial of full and 
equal treatment on the basis of disability in violation of the 
 31 Id. (quoting Angelucci v. Century Supper Club, 41 Cal.4th 160, 167 (Cal. 2007)).  
 32 Id. 
 33 Id. at 631. 
 34 CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 54–55.3 (West 2007) (Disabled Persons Act). 
 35 Munson, 208 P.3d at 631. 
 36 Id. 
 37 Id. at 632. 
 38 Id. 
 39 Id. at 633. 
 40 Id. 
Do Not Delete 5/10/2010 12:34 PM 
2010] Munson v. Del Taco, Inc. 493 
Unruh Civil Rights Act and the ADA, need not prove “intentional 
discrimination.”41 
Legal Significance 
Declining to impose a non-statutory requirement for a 
plaintiff to prove intentional discrimination when seeking 
damages for ADA violations under the Unruh Act, the court 
expressly overrules Gunther v. Lin.42  As a result, millions of 
disabled Californians who rely on the Unruh Act for protection 
from discriminatory business practices are afforded broader 
protection by eliminating overly burdensome proof requirements 
to recover remedial damages under the state antidiscrimination 
law. 
 41 Id. at 634. 
 42 Id. 
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